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OPINION OF THE COURT
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FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Amon Thomas (“Thomas”) was convicted for possession of marijuana with intent
to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), manufacture of marijuana, also in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), and maintaining a drug-involved premises, in violation of
19 V.I.C. § 608b. Thomas appeals his conviction on the basis that the District Court
erred in denying his motion to suppress. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm
the judgment of the District Court.
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case. Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
On May 12, 2008, at approximately 8:10 a.m., Officer Samuel Abraham of the
Virgin Islands Police Department (“VIPD”) heard a report over the police radio that
multiple gunshots had been fired in the vicinity of Thomas Malloy Tire Shop in the
Catherine’s Rest area of St. Croix. VIPD Officer Heyliger was in the area at the time and
observed a silver-colored vehicle pass him at a high rate of speed. Shortly thereafter,
VIPD Sergeant Cecil Gumbs informed VIPD Central Control that he witnessed the same
vehicle turn down a dead-end street adjacent to an octagonal-shaped house in Catherine’s
Rest. The octagonal house was located approximately 1,000 feet from Malloy Tire Shop.
Gumbs, Abraham, and Heyliger then met at the octagon-shaped house and began to
proceed down the street on which Gumbs had seen the silver car turn. At approximately
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8:17 a.m., the officers witnessed a red Mitsubishi Mirage exit a property located at 6-6
Catherine’s Rest and turn toward them. The red car was traveling very slowly, and as it
passed Abraham’s vehicle, Abraham noticed that someone was lying down in the back
seat. Gumbs also testified that the driver was watching the officers. Police stopped the
red Mitsubishi and ordered the occupants to exit the vehicle. The driver, Okimo
Milligan, complied, but the individual in the backseat, later identified as Thomas, waived
his hands indicating that he could not exit the vehicle. Officers soon discovered that he
had a gunshot wound to his abdomen.
After detaining Thomas and Milligan, officers proceeded to 6-6 Catherine’s Rest,
which was the only property on the street on which residential structures were located.
When they arrived, the officers observed numerous marijuana plants growing on the
property. They also discovered the silver car parked near the back of the residence.
After obtaining a search warrant, police seized 311 marijuana plants and various other
items.
On July 15, 2008, a grand jury returned a multiple-count indictment against
Thomas and several co-defendants. On January 26, 2009, the District Court held a
hearing on Thomas’s motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search of the 6-6
Catherine’s Rest property. The District Court denied Thomas’s motion on February 19,
2009, reasoning that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the red Mitsubishi and thus
any evidence seized thereafter was admissible. A jury subsequently convicted Thomas
of: (1) knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute, or aiding and
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abetting the possession with intent to distribute, 100 or more marijuana plants, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(vii); (2) knowingly and intentionally
manufacturing, or aiding and abetting the manufacturing of, 100 or more marijuana
plants, also in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(vii); and (3) maintaining a
drug-involved premises, in violation of 19 V.I.C. § 608b. Thomas filed a timely notice of
appeal.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1612 and 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. When considering the denial of a motion
to suppress, “we review the [District] Court’s underlying factual findings for clear error,
and we exercise plenary review over its application of the law to those facts.” United
States v. Mathurin, 561 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).
III.
Thomas argues that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the red
Mitsubishi and thus all evidence seized thereafter should be suppressed as fruit of the
poisonous tree. We disagree. The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop is a seizure of the vehicle’s
occupants for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d
442, 447 (3d Cir. 2010). Although a seizure generally must be effectuated with a warrant
supported by probable cause, under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), “an officer may . . .
conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion
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that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). We have
made clear, however, that “an officer cannot conduct a Terry stop simply because
criminal activity is afoot.” United States v. Goodrich, 450 F.3d 552, 560 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citations omitted). Rather, the officer must have “a particularized and objective basis for
believing that the particular person is suspected of criminal activity.” Id. (citation
omitted).
When evaluating whether there was an objective basis for reasonable suspicion,
“we consider the totality of the circumstances – the whole picture.” United States v.
Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 247 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal marks and citations omitted). “The
principal components of a determination of reasonable suspicion . . . will be the events
which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the decision whether these
historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,
amount to reasonable suspicion.” Mathurin, 561 F.3d at 174 (quoting Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). Factors that we consider include “the geographical
and temporal proximity of the stop to the scene of the alleged crime” and the lack of
other persons or vehicles in the area. Goodrich, 450 F.3d at 561, 563. Under the
reasonable suspicion standard, we accord substantial deference to the officer’s judgment
based on his “knowledge of the nature and the nuances of the type of criminal activity
that he had observed in his experience.” United States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 167
(3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
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In this case, officers possessed reasonable suspicion that the occupants of the red
Mitsubishi were connected to the shooting that had been reported minutes earlier. Soon
after the shots were heard, a silver-colored vehicle traveling at a high rate of speed was
seen turning onto a dead-end street adjacent to the octagonal-shaped house. Shortly
thereafter, the red Mitsubishi was seen by the officers departing 6-6 Catherine’s Rest,
which was the only property on the street on which buildings were located. Accordingly,
it was entirely reasonable for officers to suspect that any vehicle leaving the property was
connected to the shooting. The officers’ basis for suspicion was strengthened by the fact
that the red Mitsubishi was traveling at an usually slow speed and an individual was
observed lying down in the backseat. Under the circumstances, it was reasonable for
officers to suspect that the individual in the backseat was attempting to avoid police
detection.
Assuming, arguendo, that the stop was unjustified, the evidence seized from 6-6
Catherine’s Rest was nevertheless admissible against Thomas under the inevitable
discovery doctrine. “If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful
means . . . then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be
received.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984). Here, even if police had not
stopped the red Mitsubishi and learned that Thomas had been shot, they still would have
investigated 6-6 Catherine’s Rest because it was the only residential property on a deadend street and thus, was the likely location of the silver car. Upon arriving at the
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property, police would have inevitably discovered the marijuana plants growing on the
premises, which were in plain view. At oral argument, Thomas’s counsel argued that
Thomas would never have been tied to the marijuana had it not been for the traffic stop.
We disagree. Thomas resided in the house at 6-6 Catherine’s Rest and thus would have
inevitably become part of any police investigation related to marijuana on the premises.
Accordingly, even if officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the red Mitsubishi, the
evidence seized from 6-6 Catherine’s Rest was nevertheless admissible against Thomas.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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